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Under ongoing verification Forced organ harvesting
Published: 2026-11-07 · Event date:2026-10-20

ETAC report finds CCP committees dominate China's medical and transplant system, with 19 transplant leaders identified as Party members; the report says the structure would let systemic abuse happen 'without it being detectable from outside'

🔊 A Chinese audio reading of this record is available on the Chinese page. 简体中文

The International Coalition to End Transplant Abuse in China (ETAC) published on October 20, 2026, the first report in its 'Red Flags: Indicators of Ongoing Transplant Abuse in China' series, 'Chinese Communist Party Control: The Party's Hold on China's Medical Profession and Transplant Sector', authored by Sarah Cook, former research director for China, Hong Kong and Taiwan at Freedom House. Drawing on official Chinese sources and academic research, the report argues that CCP control over China's medical system and transplant sector is structural: virtually every healthcare facility has a Party committee, and the Party secretary's position ranks above the hospital director, medical director and other clinical and administrative staff, with Party penetration intensifying since 2018; researchers identified 19 confirmed cases across 12 provinces in which a prominent transplant surgeon or centre director was also a CCP member (not an exhaustive count), six of them the hospital's Party secretary or deputy secretary. Of the 33 members on the National Organ Donation and Transplantation Committee's 2016 list — the committee was established in 2013 by the National Health Commission and the Red Cross Society of China and is directly controlled by the State Council — 17 (52%) were confirmed CCP members, including nearly all top leadership positions, alongside two officials from the Logistics Support Department of the Central Military Commission. Organ procurement organisations (OPOs) are not independent legal entities but internal units of the transplant hospitals that need the organs; the Red Cross Society of China, officially described as the 'third-party' verifier in the donation process, is a state-supervised social organisation under Party leadership; hospital ethics committees are likewise deeply penetrated by CCP members, and their approval procedures differ from practice in North America, Europe and South America. The report concludes that Party dominance of the OPOs, the national oversight body and hospital ethics committees 'produces an essentially unified structure' in which the entire chain from procurement to transplantation 'occurs within institutions operating under the CCP's direct political leadership', with 'no point in the Chinese system where genuine independent oversight exists'. Cook expressly limits the claim: 'This architecture does not prove that abuses are occurring', but it demonstrates that 'the structural conditions for both systemic abuses and concealment are comprehensively in place'; if the CCP and Chinese hospitals wanted to sustain a classified, non-voluntary sourcing stream alongside an official voluntary stream, they could do so within this framework 'without it being detectable from outside'. The report also notes that since the formal abolition of the one-child policy in 2015, state-controlled hospitals in Xinjiang have served as operational centres for what investigators have characterised as a systematic birth-suppression campaign targeting Uyghur and other minority women, and records the long-standing political abuse of psychiatry. Bitter Winter published an analysis of the report on November 7. What this record verifies is ETAC's publication of the report and the research findings it contains; on whether abuses are occurring, the report's own author expressly limits the claim to a structural-conditions analysis rather than proof, and this site reports that limit faithfully, hence under ongoing verification. [1][2][3][4]

Why it matters

This report is worth recording for three reasons. First, it is the first time this site has covered forced organ harvesting, filling a long-standing gap: the allegations concern Falun Gong practitioners, Uyghurs, Tibetans, Christians and other persecuted groups, on the same thread as the Xinjiang repression and religious-persecution records this site already carries; with no previous record on the subject, this report is a fitting entry point. Second, the report's method of argument is itself notable: Cook does not directly assert that abuses are occurring, but demonstrates the structural conditions under which abuse could occur and could not be detected from outside — Party secretaries above hospital directors, procurement organisations subordinate to hospitals, no independent oversight, and whistleblowers facing liuzhi detention and state-secrets charges; that argument turns 'no doctor has come forward' from evidence of no abuse into evidence that the system is working as designed. Third, the evidence base is public official documentation: Party appointment lists, the membership list of the National Organ Donation and Transplantation Committee, and Huang Jiefu's 2020 report on organ transplantation development — materials anyone can re-check; whether the report's conclusions hold depends on the credibility of these public materials rather than on unverifiable secret information, which is precisely why it can be recorded. [1][2][3][4]

Full report

The basics of the report: ETAC is an independent international NGO based in Australia, founded in 2014 by lawyers, academics, medical professionals and human rights activists; the 'Red Flags' series aims to debunk, on a scientific basis, two claims — first, that the Chinese Communist government has no involvement whatsoever in organ harvesting (the Chinese government's own position), and second, that the government has carried out deep structural reforms in recent years that virtually eliminate any possible involvement of public institutions. The first report was written by Sarah Cook, who previously served as research director for China, Hong Kong and Taiwan at Freedom House, where she directed the monthly 'China Media Bulletin' and authored five special reports on authoritarianism in the PRC, and now runs China Rights Analytics and Advising and the UnderReported China newsletter. The report was published on October 20, 2026; Bitter Winter published an analysis of it on November 7. [1][2][4]

The Party committee in the hospital: the report notes that Ministry of Health regulations issued in 1978 and 1982 established that public hospitals must operate under a 'system of director responsibility under Party committee leadership' — the Party committee, not the hospital director, sits at the top of the institutional hierarchy, and the most powerful person in a Chinese public hospital is the Party secretary, whose authority over personnel, discipline and major decisions supersedes that of the doctors and administrators responsible for delivering and overseeing medical care. In 2018, the General Office of the CCP Central Committee issued formal Opinions on Strengthening Party Building Work in Public Hospitals, further institutionalising and tightening Party committee management and requiring Party leadership to be embedded in 'every aspect of hospital governance'. A former internal medicine doctor who practised at a county-level hospital in Liaoning Province for nearly two decades, now living outside China, confirmed the hierarchy to the report: 'We had a CCP branch and secretary at our hospital. And in that system, the secretary outranked the hospital head. In Mainland China, that's how things work.' [1][2]

The three central actors of the transplant system: organ procurement organisations (OPOs) — unlike in other countries, OPOs in China are neither legally independent entities nor separate from the hospitals that need the organs and perform the transplants; Huang Jiefu's 'Report on organ transplantation development in China (2015–2018)', published in 2020, explicitly acknowledges that in China an OPO is 'not an independent legal entity, which is different from that of the United States'. As subsidiary institutions of public hospitals, OPOs derive their resources from the government, must follow government policies, and are governed by the hospital's leadership structure, ultimately the hospital Party committee. The National Organ Donation and Transplantation Committee (NODTC) is a state body established in 2013 by the National Health Commission and the Red Cross Society of China and directly controlled by the State Council; it oversees the China Organ Transplant Response System (COTRS), the centralised digital platform through which all organ procurement and allocation flows; of the 33 members on its latest publicly available list, from 2016, 17 (52%) were confirmed CCP members, including nearly all top leadership positions, alongside two officials from the Logistics Support Department of the Central Military Commission and two other military officials whose CCP membership could not be confirmed. On hospital ethics committees, CCP members are strongly represented, and their approval procedures differ from standard practice in North America, Europe and South America — those systems do not require a comparable committee vote before organ retrieval, relying instead on one to three clinicians not involved in transplantation to confirm that ethical and legal standards have been met, including the declaration of death. [1][2]

Conclusion and its limits: the report concludes: 'Taken together, the Party dominance of OPOs, the national oversight body and hospital ethics committees produces an essentially unified structure. The entire chain of activity — from procurement to transplantation — occurs within institutions operating under the CCP's direct political leadership.' 'In this system, the incentives to participate in abuse or cover-up are structurally stronger than the incentives to protect victims and expose violations' and 'there is no point in the Chinese system where genuine independent oversight exists. There is no independent regulator, no professional association, no procurement organisation, no ethics committee, and no oversight body that sits outside the Party-state hierarchy. The circularity is total.' Cook also writes expressly: 'This architecture does not prove that abuses are occurring.' But it shows that 'if the CCP and Chinese hospitals wanted to sustain a classified, non-voluntary sourcing stream alongside an official voluntary stream, they could do so within this framework without it being detectable from outside. The absence of Chinese whistleblowers is therefore not evidence that no abuses are occurring. It could just as well be evidence that the system is working as designed.' [1][2]

The report also records, as an aside, that medical professionals have been incorporated into state-directed population control: under the one-child policy, hospitals performed forced abortions and sterilisations as routine institutional functions for decades; since the policy was formally abolished in 2015, similar abuses have continued in Xinjiang, where state-controlled hospitals have served as operational centres for what investigators have characterised as a systematic birth-suppression campaign targeting Uyghur and other minority women. It also records the long-documented political abuse of psychiatry, in which doctors have diagnosed and detained dissidents and religious practitioners as mentally ill at the direction of the state, and the SARS cover-up (2002–2003) and the Li Wenliang case (Wuhan, late 2019; died February 7, 2020) as precedents for medical professionals being forced into silence. Background: in March 2020, the independent China Tribunal, after 12 months of review including five days of public hearings, concluded unanimously that forced organ harvesting 'has been committed for years throughout China on a significant scale', that Falun Gong practitioners have been 'one — and probably the main — source of organ supply', and that, for Uyghurs, it had evidence of medical testing on a scale that could allow them, among other uses, to become an 'organ bank'. [1][2]

Verification note and timing: what this record verifies is ETAC's publication of the report and the research findings it contains (drawn on official documents and academic research); on whether abuses are occurring, the report's author expressly limits the claim to a structural-conditions analysis rather than proof — 'This architecture does not prove that abuses are occurring' — and this site reports that limit faithfully, making no assertion beyond the report. The report's statements on birth suppression in Xinjiang and the political abuse of psychiatry are conclusions it draws from existing investigations, attributed here to the report. Note on timing: the report was published on October 20, 2026, the EINPresswire release followed on October 23, and Bitter Winter published its analysis on November 7; this site had not previously covered forced organ harvesting and records the subject for the first time in this round. Under ongoing verification. [1][2][3][4]

Primary sources

Links above point to the original publishers of the cited reports or articles. Their conclusions are attributed in the text and do not imply that this site has independently verified every factual claim.