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持续核实Under ongoing verification 强迫摘取器官Forced organ harvesting
本站发布:2026-11-07 事件日期:2026-10-20Published: 2026-11-07 Event date: 2026-10-20

国际终止中国器官移植滥用联盟发布新报告:中共党委主导医疗与器官移植系统,19 名移植骨干为党员;报告称结构条件使系统性滥用“可以发生且无法被外界察觉”ETAC report finds CCP committees dominate China's medical and transplant system, with 19 transplant leaders identified as Party members; the report says the structure would let systemic abuse happen 'without it being detectable from outside'

🔊 听这篇报道🔊 Listen to this story 中文朗读 · 可转发给家人收听Read aloud in Chinese

国际终止中国器官移植滥用联盟(ETAC)2026 年 10 月 20 日发布“红旗:持续器官移植滥用指标”系列的首篇报告《中共控制:中共对中国医疗界与器官移植部门的掌控》,作者为前自由之家中国、香港与台湾研究主任莎拉·库克(Sarah Cook)。报告以官方文件与学术研究为据,论证中共对中国医疗系统与器官移植部门的控制是结构性的:几乎每家医疗机构都设有党委,党委书记的职位高于院长、医务主任及其他临床与行政人员,2018 年以来党委渗透进一步加深;研究确认 12 个省份 19 名知名移植外科医生或移植中心主任同时是中共党员(非穷尽统计),其中 6 人是所在医院的党委书记或副书记。国家器官捐献与移植委员会(2013 年由国家卫健委与中国红十字会设立、直属国务院)2016 年成员名单 33 人中,17 人(52%)确认为中共党员,几乎涵盖全部高层,另有两名中央军委后勤保障部官员。器官获取组织(OPO)不是独立法人,而是移植医院的内部单位;中国红十字会被官方描述为捐献过程的“第三方”核查方,实为党领导下的国家监督社会组织;医院伦理委员会亦由中共党员深度参与,其审批程序与北美、欧洲、南美的做法不同。报告的结论是:党对器官获取组织、国家监管机构与医院伦理委员会的主导形成“本质上统一的结构”,从获取到移植的整个链条都在中共直接政治领导下的机构内运行,“没有哪一个环节存在真正的独立监督”。库克本人明确限定:“这种结构并不证明滥用正在发生”,但它证明“系统性滥用与掩盖的结构条件已全面具备”;如果中共与医院想在官方自愿捐献渠道之外维持一条机密的非自愿供体渠道,“完全可以在这一框架内做到而不被外界察觉”。报告还指出,2015 年“一孩政策”正式废除后,新疆由国家控制的医院成为针对维吾尔与其他少数民族妇女的系统性压制生育运动的“运作中心”,并记录了政治滥用精神病学的长期做法。《寒冬》11 月 7 日发表评述介绍该报告。本记录核实的是 ETAC 发表该报告与报告所载研究发现这两个公开事实;报告关于滥用是否正在发生的判断,库克本人已明确限定为结构条件分析而非实证,本站如实转述该限定,定性为持续核实。[1][2][3][4]The International Coalition to End Transplant Abuse in China (ETAC) published on October 20, 2026, the first report in its 'Red Flags: Indicators of Ongoing Transplant Abuse in China' series, 'Chinese Communist Party Control: The Party's Hold on China's Medical Profession and Transplant Sector', authored by Sarah Cook, former research director for China, Hong Kong and Taiwan at Freedom House. Drawing on official Chinese sources and academic research, the report argues that CCP control over China's medical system and transplant sector is structural: virtually every healthcare facility has a Party committee, and the Party secretary's position ranks above the hospital director, medical director and other clinical and administrative staff, with Party penetration intensifying since 2018; researchers identified 19 confirmed cases across 12 provinces in which a prominent transplant surgeon or centre director was also a CCP member (not an exhaustive count), six of them the hospital's Party secretary or deputy secretary. Of the 33 members on the National Organ Donation and Transplantation Committee's 2016 list — the committee was established in 2013 by the National Health Commission and the Red Cross Society of China and is directly controlled by the State Council — 17 (52%) were confirmed CCP members, including nearly all top leadership positions, alongside two officials from the Logistics Support Department of the Central Military Commission. Organ procurement organisations (OPOs) are not independent legal entities but internal units of the transplant hospitals that need the organs; the Red Cross Society of China, officially described as the 'third-party' verifier in the donation process, is a state-supervised social organisation under Party leadership; hospital ethics committees are likewise deeply penetrated by CCP members, and their approval procedures differ from practice in North America, Europe and South America. The report concludes that Party dominance of the OPOs, the national oversight body and hospital ethics committees 'produces an essentially unified structure' in which the entire chain from procurement to transplantation 'occurs within institutions operating under the CCP's direct political leadership', with 'no point in the Chinese system where genuine independent oversight exists'. Cook expressly limits the claim: 'This architecture does not prove that abuses are occurring', but it demonstrates that 'the structural conditions for both systemic abuses and concealment are comprehensively in place'; if the CCP and Chinese hospitals wanted to sustain a classified, non-voluntary sourcing stream alongside an official voluntary stream, they could do so within this framework 'without it being detectable from outside'. The report also notes that since the formal abolition of the one-child policy in 2015, state-controlled hospitals in Xinjiang have served as operational centres for what investigators have characterised as a systematic birth-suppression campaign targeting Uyghur and other minority women, and records the long-standing political abuse of psychiatry. Bitter Winter published an analysis of the report on November 7. What this record verifies is ETAC's publication of the report and the research findings it contains; on whether abuses are occurring, the report's own author expressly limits the claim to a structural-conditions analysis rather than proof, and this site reports that limit faithfully, hence under ongoing verification. [1][2][3][4]

为什么重要WHY IT MATTERS

这篇报告值得记录,有三个原因。其一,这是本站首次收录器官摘取议题,补上长期空白:强迫摘取器官的指控涉及法轮功学员、维吾尔人、藏人、基督徒等多个受迫害群体,与本站已收录的新疆镇压、宗教迫害记录属于同一条线索;此前本站从未有过相关记录,这篇报告是进入该议题的合适起点。其二,报告的论证方式本身值得注意:库克不直接断言滥用正在发生,而是证明“滥用可以发生、且无法被外界发现”的结构条件——党委高于院长、器官获取组织隶属医院、无独立监管、举报者面临留置与泄密罪风险;这种论证把“没有医生站出来”从“没有滥用的证据”翻转为“制度按设计运转的证据”。其三,报告的取证基础是公开的官方文件:党委任职名单、国家器官捐献与移植委员会成员名单、黄洁夫 2020 年出版的器官移植发展报告——这些材料任何人都可以复核;报告的结论是否成立,取决于这些公开材料的可信度,而非无法查证的秘密消息,这正是它可被记录的原因。[1][2][3][4]This report is worth recording for three reasons. First, it is the first time this site has covered forced organ harvesting, filling a long-standing gap: the allegations concern Falun Gong practitioners, Uyghurs, Tibetans, Christians and other persecuted groups, on the same thread as the Xinjiang repression and religious-persecution records this site already carries; with no previous record on the subject, this report is a fitting entry point. Second, the report's method of argument is itself notable: Cook does not directly assert that abuses are occurring, but demonstrates the structural conditions under which abuse could occur and could not be detected from outside — Party secretaries above hospital directors, procurement organisations subordinate to hospitals, no independent oversight, and whistleblowers facing liuzhi detention and state-secrets charges; that argument turns 'no doctor has come forward' from evidence of no abuse into evidence that the system is working as designed. Third, the evidence base is public official documentation: Party appointment lists, the membership list of the National Organ Donation and Transplantation Committee, and Huang Jiefu's 2020 report on organ transplantation development — materials anyone can re-check; whether the report's conclusions hold depends on the credibility of these public materials rather than on unverifiable secret information, which is precisely why it can be recorded. [1][2][3][4]

详细记录Full report

报告的基本情况:ETAC 是 2014 年由律师、学者、医疗专业人士与人权活动人士创立的澳大利亚独立国际非政府组织;“红旗”系列旨在以科学方法逐项驳斥两种说法——其一,中共政府与器官摘取毫无关系(中方官方立场);其二,中方近年已进行深层结构性改革、基本消除了公共机构参与的可能。首篇报告由莎拉·库克撰写,她曾任自由之家中国、香港与台湾研究主任,主持《中国媒体快报》月刊并撰写五份关于中国威权主义的专题报告,现主持 China Rights Analytics and Advising 与 UnderReported China 通讯。报告于 2026 年 10 月 20 日发布,《寒冬》11 月 7 日发表评述介绍。[1][2][4]

党委在医院的地位:报告指出,1978 年与 1982 年的卫生部规定确立公立医院实行“党委领导下的院长负责制”,即党委而非院长居于机构层级顶端;最有权势的人是党委书记,其对人事、纪律与重大决策的权力高于负责医疗服务的医生与行政人员。2018 年,中共中央办公厅发布《关于加强公立医院党的建设工作的意见》,进一步制度化并收紧党委管理,要求把党的领导嵌入医院治理的“各个方面”。一位在辽宁某县级医院执业近二十年、现居海外的前内科医生向报告证实:“我们医院有党支部和书记,在那个体系里,书记比院长官大,在中国大陆就是这样运作的。”[1][2]

移植系统的三方结构:器官获取组织(OPO)——与其他国家不同,中国的器官获取组织既不是独立法人、也不独立于需要器官并实施移植的医院;黄洁夫《中国器官移植发展报告(2015–2018)》(2020 年出版)明确承认,中国的 OPO“不是独立法人,这与美国不同”。OPO 作为公立医院的下属机构,资源来自政府,运作须服从政府政策,治理归属医院领导层、最终归属医院党委。国家器官捐献与移植委员会(NODTC)是 2013 年由国家卫健委与中国红十字会设立的国家机构、直属国务院,负责监管中国人体器官分配与共享计算机系统(COTRS);其 2016 年成员名单 33 人中 17 人(52%)确认为中共党员,几乎涵盖全部高层,另有两名中央军委后勤保障部官员与两名无法确认党员身份的军方人员。医院伦理委员会方面,中共党员深度参与,且审批程序与北美、欧洲、南美不同——那些地区不需要在器官获取前进行委员会投票,而是由一至三名不参与移植的临床医生确认符合伦理与法律标准、包括死亡判定。[1][2]

结论与限定:报告的结论是:“综合来看,党对器官获取组织、国家监管机构与医院伦理委员会的主导,形成了一个本质上统一的结构。从获取到移植的整个活动链条,都发生在中共直接政治领导下的机构内部。”“在这一制度中,参与滥用或掩盖的激励,在结构上强于保护受害者与揭露违规的激励”,“中国制度中没有任何一个环节存在真正的独立监督。没有独立的监管机构、专业协会、采购组织、伦理委员会或监督机构脱离党国层级。循环是完整的。”库克同时明确写道:“这种结构并不证明滥用正在发生”,但它表明,“如果中共与中国医院想在官方自愿渠道之外维持一条机密的、非自愿的供体渠道,完全可以在这一框架内做到而不被外界察觉。中国医生无人挺身而出,因此不是没有滥用的证据;它同样可能是制度按设计运转的证据。”[1][2]

报告还以“附论”方式记录了医务人员被纳入国家主导的人口控制:独生子女政策下,医院数十年如一日地把强制堕胎与绝育作为常规机构职能;2015 年政策正式废除后,类似做法在新疆继续——由国家控制的医院成为针对维吾尔与其他少数民族妇女的系统性压制生育运动的“运作中心”。报告还记录了长期存在的政治滥用精神病学做法:医生按国家指令把异见者与宗教信徒诊断为精神病并关押;以及 SARS 掩盖(2002–2003 年)与李文亮事件(2019 年底武汉、2020 年 2 月 7 日去世)作为医务人员被迫沉默的前例。背景:2020 年 3 月,独立的中国法庭(China Tribunal)经 12 个月审查、五天公开听证后一致认定,强迫摘取器官“多年来在中国大规模发生”,法轮功学员是“一个、而且很可能是主要的”器官供应来源;就维吾尔人而言,法庭掌握的大规模医学检测证据表明,他们可能被用作“器官库”。[1][2]

核实说明与时效:本记录核实的是 ETAC 发表该报告与报告所载研究发现(以官方文件与学术研究为据)这两个公开事实;报告关于滥用是否正在发生的判断,库克本人已明确限定为结构条件分析而非实证——“这种结构并不证明滥用正在发生”——本站如实转述该限定,不作超出报告的断言。报告关于新疆压制生育与政治滥用精神病学的陈述,系报告引述既有调查的结论,本站按报告原文归属。时效说明:报告发表于 2026 年 10 月 20 日,EINPresswire 通稿 10 月 23 日,《寒冬》11 月 7 日发表评述;本站此前从未收录器官摘取议题,本轮首次收录。定性为持续核实。[1][2][3][4]

The basics of the report: ETAC is an independent international NGO based in Australia, founded in 2014 by lawyers, academics, medical professionals and human rights activists; the 'Red Flags' series aims to debunk, on a scientific basis, two claims — first, that the Chinese Communist government has no involvement whatsoever in organ harvesting (the Chinese government's own position), and second, that the government has carried out deep structural reforms in recent years that virtually eliminate any possible involvement of public institutions. The first report was written by Sarah Cook, who previously served as research director for China, Hong Kong and Taiwan at Freedom House, where she directed the monthly 'China Media Bulletin' and authored five special reports on authoritarianism in the PRC, and now runs China Rights Analytics and Advising and the UnderReported China newsletter. The report was published on October 20, 2026; Bitter Winter published an analysis of it on November 7. [1][2][4]

The Party committee in the hospital: the report notes that Ministry of Health regulations issued in 1978 and 1982 established that public hospitals must operate under a 'system of director responsibility under Party committee leadership' — the Party committee, not the hospital director, sits at the top of the institutional hierarchy, and the most powerful person in a Chinese public hospital is the Party secretary, whose authority over personnel, discipline and major decisions supersedes that of the doctors and administrators responsible for delivering and overseeing medical care. In 2018, the General Office of the CCP Central Committee issued formal Opinions on Strengthening Party Building Work in Public Hospitals, further institutionalising and tightening Party committee management and requiring Party leadership to be embedded in 'every aspect of hospital governance'. A former internal medicine doctor who practised at a county-level hospital in Liaoning Province for nearly two decades, now living outside China, confirmed the hierarchy to the report: 'We had a CCP branch and secretary at our hospital. And in that system, the secretary outranked the hospital head. In Mainland China, that's how things work.' [1][2]

The three central actors of the transplant system: organ procurement organisations (OPOs) — unlike in other countries, OPOs in China are neither legally independent entities nor separate from the hospitals that need the organs and perform the transplants; Huang Jiefu's 'Report on organ transplantation development in China (2015–2018)', published in 2020, explicitly acknowledges that in China an OPO is 'not an independent legal entity, which is different from that of the United States'. As subsidiary institutions of public hospitals, OPOs derive their resources from the government, must follow government policies, and are governed by the hospital's leadership structure, ultimately the hospital Party committee. The National Organ Donation and Transplantation Committee (NODTC) is a state body established in 2013 by the National Health Commission and the Red Cross Society of China and directly controlled by the State Council; it oversees the China Organ Transplant Response System (COTRS), the centralised digital platform through which all organ procurement and allocation flows; of the 33 members on its latest publicly available list, from 2016, 17 (52%) were confirmed CCP members, including nearly all top leadership positions, alongside two officials from the Logistics Support Department of the Central Military Commission and two other military officials whose CCP membership could not be confirmed. On hospital ethics committees, CCP members are strongly represented, and their approval procedures differ from standard practice in North America, Europe and South America — those systems do not require a comparable committee vote before organ retrieval, relying instead on one to three clinicians not involved in transplantation to confirm that ethical and legal standards have been met, including the declaration of death. [1][2]

Conclusion and its limits: the report concludes: 'Taken together, the Party dominance of OPOs, the national oversight body and hospital ethics committees produces an essentially unified structure. The entire chain of activity — from procurement to transplantation — occurs within institutions operating under the CCP's direct political leadership.' 'In this system, the incentives to participate in abuse or cover-up are structurally stronger than the incentives to protect victims and expose violations' and 'there is no point in the Chinese system where genuine independent oversight exists. There is no independent regulator, no professional association, no procurement organisation, no ethics committee, and no oversight body that sits outside the Party-state hierarchy. The circularity is total.' Cook also writes expressly: 'This architecture does not prove that abuses are occurring.' But it shows that 'if the CCP and Chinese hospitals wanted to sustain a classified, non-voluntary sourcing stream alongside an official voluntary stream, they could do so within this framework without it being detectable from outside. The absence of Chinese whistleblowers is therefore not evidence that no abuses are occurring. It could just as well be evidence that the system is working as designed.' [1][2]

The report also records, as an aside, that medical professionals have been incorporated into state-directed population control: under the one-child policy, hospitals performed forced abortions and sterilisations as routine institutional functions for decades; since the policy was formally abolished in 2015, similar abuses have continued in Xinjiang, where state-controlled hospitals have served as operational centres for what investigators have characterised as a systematic birth-suppression campaign targeting Uyghur and other minority women. It also records the long-documented political abuse of psychiatry, in which doctors have diagnosed and detained dissidents and religious practitioners as mentally ill at the direction of the state, and the SARS cover-up (2002–2003) and the Li Wenliang case (Wuhan, late 2019; died February 7, 2020) as precedents for medical professionals being forced into silence. Background: in March 2020, the independent China Tribunal, after 12 months of review including five days of public hearings, concluded unanimously that forced organ harvesting 'has been committed for years throughout China on a significant scale', that Falun Gong practitioners have been 'one — and probably the main — source of organ supply', and that, for Uyghurs, it had evidence of medical testing on a scale that could allow them, among other uses, to become an 'organ bank'. [1][2]

Verification note and timing: what this record verifies is ETAC's publication of the report and the research findings it contains (drawn on official documents and academic research); on whether abuses are occurring, the report's author expressly limits the claim to a structural-conditions analysis rather than proof — 'This architecture does not prove that abuses are occurring' — and this site reports that limit faithfully, making no assertion beyond the report. The report's statements on birth suppression in Xinjiang and the political abuse of psychiatry are conclusions it draws from existing investigations, attributed here to the report. Note on timing: the report was published on October 20, 2026, the EINPresswire release followed on October 23, and Bitter Winter published its analysis on November 7; this site had not previously covered forced organ harvesting and records the subject for the first time in this round. Under ongoing verification. [1][2][3][4]

核实来源

Primary sources

上述链接是所引用报告或文章的原始发布方。其结论已在正文中明确归属,不代表本站独立完成了全部事实认定。Links above point to the original publishers of the cited reports or articles. Their conclusions are attributed in the text and do not imply that this site has independently verified every factual claim.